In the coming days, Kyiv will move even closer to the European Union. Under Viktor Orbán, Budapest blocked the start of substantive negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU, but a change in power following Hungary's April elections has allowed for a breakthrough. According to media reports, the opening of the first of six thematic negotiation clusters is to be announced on June 15 at an intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg. This first cluster concerns issues such as financial control, justice, and the protection of citizens' fundamental rights. In total, the parties will have to work through 35 negotiation chapters covering various areas of interaction: from judicial proceedings and taxation to security and environmental protection. The material from 'Novaya Gazeta Europe' discusses the path still ahead for Ukraine and potential obstacles. Silhouette of the 'Motherland Monument' against a sunset sky in Kyiv, Ukraine, November 2, 2023. Photo: Eugen Kotenko / Ukrinform / ZUMA Press Wire / Scanpix / LETA. The Road is Open Two years ago, on June 25, 2024, participants in the first EU-Ukraine intergovernmental conference formally launched accession negotiations. However, this was largely a political gesture, as the difficult negotiation process did not de facto begin then or a year later. By early June 2026, the situation has moved forward: sources from Politico and Kyiv Independent reported that an intergovernmental conference will be held in Luxembourg on June 15, where negotiations on the first cluster will be officially opened. This is an event Kyiv has been anticipating for two years. What are these clusters? Membership negotiations involve analyzing national legislation for compliance with the acquis, the body of EU legislation, divided into 35 chapters. Since 2020, 33 of these have been grouped into six thematic clusters: 'Foundations,' 'Internal Market,' 'Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth,' 'Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity,' 'Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion,' and 'External Relations.' The 'Foundations' cluster includes issues such as the rule of law, the judicial system, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration, public procurement, statistics, and financial control. This cluster is opened first and closed last, as it is ultimately used to judge a country's readiness. Chapters 34 and 35, 'Institutes' and 'Miscellaneous,' are handled separately at the very end. The negotiation mechanism is structured such that progress can stall at any step. The opening and closing of each cluster require a unanimous decision from all 27 member states. This is precisely why the formal start in 2024 did not lead to substantive progress for so long. The sole obstacle was Hungary. The process was unblocked by Hungarian voters. On April 12, Péter Magyar's 'Tisza' party defeated Viktor Orbán's 'Fidesz,' which had been in power for 16 consecutive years. In early May, Magyar replaced Orbán as prime minister, and negotiations with Brussels took a new turn. By the end of the month, the new Hungarian prime minister had reached an agreement with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to unfreeze almost all of Hungary's allocated funds from the EU's recovery and cohesion funds, amounting to €16.4 billion. Magyar publicly denied any link between the unfreezing of funds and the opening of the Ukrainian cluster, although the connection is evident. Optimistic statements began to emerge from Brussels. For instance, Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi stated in an interview with the Financial Times that 'the narrative has changed': the first cluster will open in June, and the rest in July. However, it was not that simple. Budapest had already specified its price for lifting the veto under Orbán: '11 points' concerning the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. The new prime minister proved no less firm on this issue than his predecessor. 'The most important thing for us is guarantees for the 100,000 Hungarians living in Ukraine, ensuring they can use their native language in schools, cultural events, and public administration,' Magyar emphasized. Active technical negotiations with Kyiv began almost immediately after Magyar's government was formed, and by late May, the Ukrainian broadcaster 'Suspilne' reported that nine out of the 11 demands had been met. Against this backdrop, Magyar proposed a meeting with Zelenskyy in Berehove, a Ukrainian city in Transcarpathia with a Hungarian majority. Consequently, on June 3, Magyar announced that negotiators had 'achieved in three weeks what Viktor Orbán could not achieve in ten years'—'full agreement with Ukraine on expanding the language, educational, cultural, and political rights of the hundred-thousand-strong Hungarian minority' in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently announced the commencement of 'a new stage in relations, built on mutual respect, trust, and a common European future.' On June 5, it was reported that the leaders of the two reconciled countries might meet not in Berehove, but in Budapest. The Ukrainian Ambassador to Hungary, Fedir Shandor, spoke about the negotiations regarding this possibility. He did not name a potential date for the visit. Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar speaks at a press conference in Budapest, Hungary, May 18, 2026. Photo: Robert Hegedus / EPA. Progress Scale Regardless of where Zelenskyy and Magyar ultimately meet, it is now clear that nothing will prevent the start of substantive negotiations between Ukraine and the EU, though not all clusters will be opened simultaneously, as Ukraine had advocated. According to an informed source cited by 'Evropeyska Pravda,' considerable preparatory work remains before the planned intergovernmental conference in Luxembourg on June 15, including efforts in working groups and at the ambassadorial level in Brussels. It is expected that the EU's common negotiating position for the first cluster will be approved this week. By the summer of 2026, Ukraine had already made significant progress in aligning its legislation with EU norms. Several sources help answer the question of how many steps remain. Firstly, there are the Enlargement Reports, prepared annually by the European Commission. The latest report on Ukraine was published on November 4, 2025 (covering the period from September 1, 2024, to September 1, 2025). It begins by stating that 'Ukraine continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience and a firm commitment to its European path,' although it also notes 'significant causes for concern.' Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka described the enlargement report as 'the best in three years': 'The European Commission has for the first time recognized our record progress in most reform areas.' 'Higher reform speed (improved progress) is observed in 15 negotiation chapters. In 12 chapters, this progress is rated as 'good progress,' the Deputy Prime Minister wrote on Facebook. For example, customs received one of the highest ratings in the report—'good level of readiness' and 'good progress.' In taxation, there was 'good progress' with moderate readiness. Financial control improved from 'limited' progress to 'good' over the year. In common foreign policy and sanctions, Ukraine showed near-complete alignment with the EU: 95% in 2024 and 99% in 2025. The main risk remains the fragility of the anti-corruption architecture. A dramatic episode in July 2025, when the parliament attempted to strip the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) of their independence by subordinating them to the Prosecutor General, served as a worrying signal for Brussels. Although the autonomy of these bodies was restored, trust was somewhat undermined. Furthermore, the document notes that 'anti-corruption institutions and civil society report increasing pressure from state bodies, including criminal investigations by law enforcement and security agencies.' 'Overall, these events call into question Ukraine's commitment to the anti-corruption agenda,' the European Commission concluded. Another problematic area is the judiciary (indicating a constant shortage of personnel and a high workload for courts). Additionally, the report noted that the position of Prosecutor General remains politicized. A second source of information is the reports on the implementation of the Association Agreement signed in 2014, prepared by the Ukrainian side. This document implies the need for structural reforms in the same legislative areas as in the EU accession process. By the end of 2021, Ukraine had completed 63% of the necessary work. By the end of 2024, progress reached 81%, and a year later, it was 84%. Leading areas include 'Statistics and Information Exchange' (100%), 'Education and Youth' (99%), 'Intellectual Property' (98%), and 'Customs' (96%). The most significant gains over the year were in 'Financial Sector' (+8%) and 'Social Policy and Labor Relations' (+7%). Lagging areas include 'Financial Cooperation and Fight Against Fraud' (24%, unchanged from the previous year) and 'Transport, Transport Infrastructure, Postal and Courier Services' (59%, +1 percentage point). The findings of Ukrainian private analytical projects, such as UAEUMeter and Vox Ukraine, are also indicative. For instance, analysts from Vox Ukraine examined 180 reforms of varying scale in 2025 and summarized their findings with the sobering phrase: 'More reforms do not always mean more progress.' The vast majority of decisions in 2025—172—received positive assessments. Of these, 32 were rated +2 or higher on a scale of -5 to +5 (the threshold separating significant reforms from less important regulatory changes). According to experts, the greatest progress in 2025 'occurred in social policy, business regulation, and healthcare, generally aligning with citizens' expectations.' However, there were also four decisions that Vox Ukraine considered steps backward. 'Most of the counter-reforms in 2025 are related to the anti-corruption sphere. This is a worrying signal, as the resilience of anti-corruption institutions is one of the key conditions for Ukraine's future EU membership,' the experts stated. Reforms continued in 2026; for example, an analysis by Vox Ukraine published on June 3 discusses five reforms carried out between January 12 and 25. After the Clusters Some of the 35 chapters will be closed quickly, while others will require significant work. However, even the completion of this process will not be the end of European integration. First, the European Commission and the Council of the EU must issue a positive opinion on the country's readiness for EU membership, after which all involved states and the candidate country must sign an Accession Treaty, which then needs to be ratified (either by parliamentary vote or national referendums). Each of these stages can present challenges. Doubts among the current 27 EU member states can be broadly categorized into two main groups: financial-economic concerns and security-related issues. For instance, due to migration pressure, many countries are hesitant to immediately grant Ukrainians freedom of movement for labor. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto noted: 'If Ukraine, given its size and economic system, were to join Europe, many EU countries would immediately face a very serious agricultural crisis, which even Germany cannot afford.' The strong resistance in several European countries to the recent EU trade agreement with MERCOSUR (the common market of South American countries) highlights the complexity of this issue. Equally important is the fact that Ukraine is a country with significantly lower incomes than the European average, necessitating additional spending on agricultural subsidies and the equalization of economic development levels. According to calculations by the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, the net cost to current EU countries from Ukraine's accession would be €136 billion at current prices for the period 2021-2027, equivalent to 0.13% of the EU's total GDP for the same period. While a significant sum, it is not ruinous, contrary to popular fears. Experts note that for recipients of EU funds, any additional reduction in payments would be relatively small compared to the decreases already experienced in recent years. Meanwhile, most EU budget donors would have to increase their contributions by approximately 0.1% of GDP under the baseline scenario. However, some Eastern European countries risk transitioning from aid recipients to donors, which would naturally be a sensitive change for them. Independence Square in the center of Kyiv, Ukraine, August 11, 2025. Photo: Gleb Garanich / Reuters / Scanpix / LETA. Former Italian Prime Minister and former European Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni, responding to Guido Crosetto's statement, argued that the concern that 'the accession of a large country with a lower per capita income than the rest of Europe could harm the other 27 states' should be taken seriously. 'In the next three to four years, an assessment of the consequences will be needed—primarily for agricultural policy and cohesion funds. But solutions are possible, as demonstrated by the examples of Poland (remember the 'Polish plumber' ghost?) and Romania. And the benefits should be obvious,' Gentiloni added. Specifically, the burden on the EU budget can be reduced by employing various 'limiters' already enshrined in current legislation. For instance, when Spain joined the EU (then the European Economic Community) in 1986, its farmers did not immediately gain access to subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy. A similar transitional period could be established for Ukraine. Temporary restrictions could also be introduced to protect the labor markets and social security systems of EU member states. In the same column, Paolo Gentiloni dismissed other arguments against Kyiv's Euro-integration as unfounded, particularly those related to security: the claim that EU enlargement would be an 'act of aggression against Russia' and would provoke Vladimir Putin into further provocations. The position that Ukraine's EU accession cannot be considered until the war with Russia ends is held, for example, by Slovak President Peter Pellegrini. He is convinced that substantive accession negotiations can only begin after a just peace is achieved. Meanwhile, Gentiloni is confident: 'Ukraine's accession will be a significant strengthening of European defense and, consequently, an important factor in deterring future aggression.' Waiting in the Antechamber Amidst such European disagreements, various scenarios for Ukraine's integration are being discussed. In the spring of 2026, as 'Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty' (RFE/RL) revealed, 'discussion papers' circulated among EU capitals, containing proposals from various member states. For example, the French idea was to introduce the status of an 'integrated state'—'an accelerator towards membership, not a substitute for it.' This would involve participation in key EU institutions, but without voting rights, granting citizens symbolic benefits, and participation in EU funding programs—though not in key redistribution mechanisms like the Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funds that channel money to poorer regions of the Union. Germany proposed 'associated membership,' also envisioning participation in EU institutions without voting rights, with 'associated commissioners without portfolios' and 'associated Members of the European Parliament.' Furthermore, it discussed the gradual integration of an 'associated member' into the EU's single market and granting it the option to utilize Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union (on mutual defense). While this cannot be considered a full replacement for NATO Article 5 or American guarantees for European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine, Kyiv's EU membership would thus complicate the calculations of Russian military strategists. The 'Motherland Monument' illuminated in the colors of the EU flag during Europe Day celebrations, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 9, 2026. Photo: Pavlo Bahmut / Ukrinform / ZUMA Press Wire / Scanpix / LETA. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, among others, has publicly spoken about the possibility of 'associated membership.' He explained that completing the accession process in the short term is impossible due to 'innumerable obstacles' and politically complex ratification procedures in several member states, whereas the option proposed by Berlin would bring tangible benefits to Kyiv and also serve as 'a strong political signal that Ukraine and its citizens urgently need in their ongoing struggle against Russian aggression.' There was also a Lithuanian document, which most forcefully argued that 'full membership must remain the sole ultimate goal of Ukraine's accession process.' Among its proposals was the idea that progress towards membership 'cannot be halted for reasons unrelated to accession criteria and must depend on objectively assessed reform results.' This would serve as protection against the threat of repeated blockades like Orbán's. One of the concepts discussed is the use of the status of a 'acceding state.' Formally, this status only arises after signing an accession treaty with the EU, but Vilnius proposes allowing its provisions to be applied much earlier. Another idea is to set 2030 as a 'conditional and achievement-based date for Ukraine's accession to the EU.' These proposals share a common theme: ushering Ukraine into the EU's 'anteroom.' Access to institutions—but without voting rights. Access to the market—but without major financial flows, the common agricultural policy, and cohesion funds. Essentially, membership without membership, beneficial to both sides and deferring the most difficult final stage of unanimous decision-making. Meanwhile, Kyiv fears getting stuck in this 'anteroom' for a long time and de facto gaining little. In a letter to the EU leadership, obtained by Reuters, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated: 'We are defending Europe—fully, not partially or with half-measures.' According to him, 'it would be unfair if Ukraine were present in the EU but remained without a voice.' 'Now is the time to move forward with Ukraine's membership in a full and meaningful way,' Zelenskyy also added, referencing the removal of Viktor Orbán as an obstacle. The Ukrainian government believes that some negotiation chapters could be closed this year, and all without exception next year, after which preparations for the Accession Treaty can begin.